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ANALYSING CONSCIENCE AS THE MEDIATING 
CONCEPT BETWEEN THE FREE MARKET AND 




In light of new amendments to the Property Agents and 
Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld), this paper reviews the 
conceptual framework within which this Act delivers 
consumer protection within the free market. It compares the 
equivalent protection provisions of the Retail Shop Leases 
Act 1994 (Qld) and assesses whether ‘conscience’ can 
provide a mediating factor between consumer protection 
and contract law, or whether these measures effectively 
remove these contracts from common law contract into 
their own discrete fi eld. It concludes that implicit reliance 
on conscience without clearly articulating a standard of 
conscience leaves these contracts without a clear place 
within common law doctrine of unconscionability or an 
effective consumer protection foundation.
I  INTRODUCTION
The Queensland residential property market has been regulated now for 
some 10 years, and the Queensland retail shop lease market for nearly 
30. Enough time has now elapsed to assess whether the mechanisms 
of regulation of each of these otherwise free markets are capable of 
achieving consumer protection within the broader free market supported 
by contract law. 
In this paper, the consumer protection provisions in the Property Agents 
and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld) (‘PAMDA’) dealing with residential 
real property sales and the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) (‘RSLA’) 
(together, the ‘Acts’), will serve to illustrate the intersection between 
* B Econ, LLB, LLM, Senior Lecturer, School of Law James Cook 
University.
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what is referred to in this paper as ‘statutory conscience’, and the 
operation of free-market principles in the law of contract. It is taken 
as given that classical contract theory resting on the liberal philosophy 
of the free market continues to underpin the operation, application and 
development of contract law.1
This paper will argue that there is potential for the concept of conscience 
to mediate between the idea of consumer protection and the classical 
‘free market’ contract. Without a means of reconciling the mechanisms 
of consumer protection provided by the Acts and principles of freedom 
and autonomy implicit in common law contract, it is possible that 
increasing statutory regulation of transactions in these markets will 
‘rob contract law of its subject matter … removing from “contract” 
transactions and situations formerly governed by it …’2
After providing an overview of the methodology of these provisions, 
this paper seeks briefl y to chart the transformation of the equitable 
doctrine of unconscionability to the principle of unconscionability now 
widely found in common law and in legislation,3 contextualising the 
Queensland Parliament’s apparent appeal to conscience in these statutes.4 
Contract has traditionally used the principle of caveat emptor to indicate 
the individualist nature of the relationship between the parties, and it is 
this framework that infl uences our contemporary understanding of the 
nature of contract in the laissez-faire marketplace. Unconscionability, 
too, can be understood in terms of traditional libertarian principles of 
freedom of contract,5 and this paper explores whether these legislative 
provisions, based on conscience, can be said to shift the underpinning 
conceptualisation of contract towards one that encompasses a general 
standard of conscience — an unconscionability principle — or whether 
instead they move these types of contract outside the common law 
1 See, eg, Kate Galloway, ‘Statutory Modifi cation of Contract Law in 
Queensland: A New Equilibrium or Entrenching the Old Power Order?’ 
(2008) 15 JCU Law Review 67.
2 Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract (Ohio State University Press, 1974), 
6.
3 See Joachim Dietrich, ‘Giving Content to General Concepts’ [2005] 
Melbourne University Law Review 6, where he points out that the term 
‘may indicate the broad moral principles or general ideas at work in the 
law, without avoiding more specifi c reasoning to justify decisions’.  
4 See, eg, Galloway, ‘Statutory Modifi cation’, above n 1, at footnotes 85–7.
5 See, eg, Rick Bigwood, ‘Conscience and the Liberal Conception of Contract: 
Observing the Basic Distinctions Part I’ (2000) Journal of Contract Law 
6.
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contract framework altogether. 
II CONSUMER PROTECTION IN REAL PROPERTY MARKETS
Consumer protection is generally considered to relate to regulation of 
activities in the market for non-business goods and services. Though 
it may include acquisition of an interest in land,6 Colin Scott and Julia 
Black have pointed out that 
[t]ransactions involving land are mentioned only incidentally. 
In this sense … the thrust of consumer protection legislation [is 
that] such legislation confi nes itself to transactions involving 
‘goods’ and ‘services’.7
Some real property transactions, notably residential tenancies and 
retirement homes, have, of course, long been regulated as consumer 
transactions8 — in each case there is recognition of the subject matter 
of these transactions as personal, in that they relate to the home. In 
each case, there is an ostensibly powerful party (the retirement village 
operator and the landlord) and an ostensibly disempowered party (the 
retiree and the tenant) and the balance of power (or equality of bargaining 
position) is an obvious concern. The nature of the transaction (personal) 
and the potential for misuse of power, together result in a consumer 
transaction. 
In contrast to the more traditional focus of consumer protection 
confi ned largely to goods and services, and in addition to residential 
tenancy regulation, Queensland has also for some time boasted a 
variety of statutory mechanisms to protect buyers of residential land in 
Queensland and tenants of Queensland retail shops. In general terms, 
these mechanisms alter the common law process of contract formation 
through requiring pre-contractual warning notices and disclosures.9 The 
Acts have introduced restrictions on existing real property markets that 
had previously relied on the operation of common law contract. 
Regulating broader real property transactions changes the consumer 
protection landscape in a couple of ways: fi rst, by introducing markets 
6 See, eg, Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 4B and Australian Consumer 
Law, s 2(3)(b); Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld), s 6. 
7 C Scott and J Black, Cranston’s Consumers and the Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 3rd ed, 2000), 8.
8 Protection for tenants in Queensland is now contained in the Residential 
Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008 (Qld); Retirement 
Villages Act 1999 (Qld).
9 Scott and Black, above n7, 10.
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for non-traditional consumer ‘goods’ (ie, real property); and secondly, 
by the suite of mechanisms of protection.
Warning and disclosure statements are of course familiar tools of 
consumer protection — including in real property transactions. They 
have been used in the case of transactions involving retirement villages10 
and in the purchase of off-the-plan community title.11 Each of these 
markets can be identifi ed as involving an identifi ably ‘consumer’ party 
and the application of consumer protection within these real property 
markets is perhaps a logical extension of regulation of sale of goods and 
services. These mechanisms have not however usually been applied in 
the context of the open market in other real property, in which common 
law contract has retained its hold.
Consumer protection within real property markets generally is perhaps 
most familiar in terms of implied terms (such as those imposed by the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)12). Implied terms, some of which were 
codifi ed or were based on the common law (and which will become 
part of the law in the form of guarantees of rights — see above), work 
alongside common law principles such as misrepresentation to protect 
people from bargains that in some way did not represent the will of the 
parties. These statutory inroads into contract law remain a refl ection or 
an extension of mechanisms within the common law itself, and therefore 
fi t within liberal classical contract concepts such as freedom of contract. 
They require the foundation of the market and existing legal principles 
to operate.13 They do not alter the way we think about contract law. This 
kind of intrusion into real property contracts has generally enforced the 
existing paradigm of contract law, premised as it is on the existence of 
a contract according to classical common law principles. 
Nicola Howell argues that consumer protection needs to be taken 
beyond the application of classical contract theory, represented by and 
representing the market, and into a new framework that represents 
instead the ‘perspectives and realities of consumers’.14 She suggests 
10 Retirement Villages Act (1999) (Qld).
11 Body Corporate and Community Management Act (1997) (Qld).
12 See, eg, s 69. Note the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer 
Law) Act (No 2) 2010 (Cth) (‘ACL2’), due to commence on 1 January 2011, 
replaces the scheme of implied terms with guarantees of consumer rights: 
see, eg, ss 51–59.
13 Galloway, ‘Statutory Modifi cation’ above n 1.
14 Nicola Howell, ‘Catching Up With Consumer Realities: The Need for 
Legislation Prohibiting Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts’ (2006) 34 
Australian Business Law Review 447, 463.
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unfair terms legislation that would deal with both substantive and 
procedural injustice. She points out that provisions in Australia have 
not supported consumers as one might assume that they would.15 Part of 
the reason for this is the overwhelming importance invested in freedom 
of contract and the inviolability of a bargain.  
The recently enacted Australian Consumer Law (‘ACL’) unfair contract 
provisions seem to answer this criticism in the context of residential land 
sales.16 Of note, the provisions identify a range of provisions as ‘unfair’, 
with a focus on parties’ relative power.17 While the Commonwealth’s 
jurisdiction under the ACL1 is limited to conduct of corporations,18 the 
Fair Trading (Australian Consumer Law) Amendment Bill 2010 (Qld) 
provides no such limitation.19 In terms of real property transactions, the 
State scheme therefore shifts the emphasis from the idea of a (powerful) 
corporate vendor against a (weaker) consumer purchaser and opens up 
the possibility of review of a contract based on the reality of a ‘signifi cant 
imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations’.20
Enactment of unfair contract legislation represents a move away from the 
notion of an inviolable bargain and transactions identifi able by subject 
matter, through its focus on actual imbalances of power. However, the 
approach of the ACL1 differs from the methodology of the Acts in the 
explicit description of what is unfair, and the rationale for fi nding such 
terms void.21
A  Challenging the Inviolable Bargain
In step with Howell’s thinking (and according implicitly with the 
approach of the ACL1 unfair contracts provisions) under the Acts 
bargains are not inviolable. The ACL1 focus, however, like that of the 
15 Ibid.
16 Where those sales are ‘to an individual … [w]holly or predominantly 
for personal, domestic or household use …’ Trade Practices Amendment 
(Australian Consumer Law) Act (No 1) 2010 (Cth), s 2(3)(b) (‘ACL1’).
17 ACL, s 4.
18 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 130.
19 Section 16 will enact the Australian Consumer Law in Queensland, and s 
4A identifi es jurisdiction over individuals as well corporations.
20 ACL1 s 3.
21 ACL1, s 3: a contract term is unfair if it would ‘cause a signifi cant imbalance 
in the parties’ rights … it is not reasonably necessary … and it would cause 
detriment …’
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Trade Practices Act implied terms,22 is on already formed contracts. In 
contrast the Acts work outside the framework of classical contract law 
through altering the very foundation of the contract’s existence. This is 
because the Acts’ approach towards consumer protection23 apparently 
rests upon promoting the application of conscience by landlords and 
sellers in the regulated transactions.24 
Explanatory Notes to both the Bill introducing the relevant amendments 
to the RSLA and the PAMDA refer to the central idea of conscience: 
[i]ncreasing the level of pre-lease information that must be 
exchanged between parties to the lease will also serve to actively 
address the potential threat of action under the ‘unconscionable 
provisions’...25
[Marketeers] have adopted unconscionable practices which 
continue to result in massive consumer detriment. … The 
legislative response in the overall strategy is focussed on a broad 
regulatory response to the marketplace behaviour and conduct 
...26
The PAMDA mechanisms involve annexation of a warning statement 
in the prescribed form to a ‘proposed relevant contract’ and a ‘relevant 
contract’.27 Failure to provide the warning in this way entitles the buyer 
to terminate the contract, without penalty, at any point up to completion,28 
and exposes the seller or their agent to a penalty.
In contrast to classical contract principles that require parties to carry 
out their bargain freely entered into, the buyer may end the contract, 
suffering only nominal penalty, at any time during a fi ve day cooling-off 
period.29 Additionally, in contradistinction to contract law requirements 
of offer and acceptance, until the recent amendments to the PAMDA, the 
22 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 69, soon to be replaced by consumer 
guarantees under ACL2.
23 See reference in Property Agents and Motor Dealer and Other Legislation 
Amendment Bill 2010 (Qld) Explanatory Notes, pp 1, 3, 6; PAMDA s 
363(b), (c).
24 See Galloway, ‘Statutory Modifi cation’ above n 1, 85.
25 Retail Shop Leases Amendment Bill 2000 (Qld) Explanatory Notes, 7–8.
26 Property Agents and Motor Dealers Amendment Bill 2001 (Qld) Explanatory 
Notes, 1, 2.
27 PAMDA, ss 368A, 368C.
28 PAMDA, s 370(2). This must occur within 90 days of the day the buyer 
receives the copy of the contract (s 370(4)). As most residential contracts 
settle in a month, this limitation will only affect a minority of contracts.
29 PAMDA, s 370A(1).
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contract did not become binding until the buyer received a copy of the 
contract signed by both buyer and seller.30  
The Property Agents and Motor Dealers and Other Legislation 
Amendment Act 2010 (Qld) has recognised the impact of these consumer 
protection mechanisms on the ‘marketplace’. In seeking to ‘restore 
certainty to the marketplace’ it seeks to change the ‘prescriptive nature’ 
of these consumer protection mechanisms.31
The requirements for ‘attaching’ a warning statement have  
been simplifi ed through defi ning ‘attached’ to include methods 
for electronic and physical delivery (s 364).
The commencement of the cooling-off period where a buyer  
signs after the seller, now occurs when the buyer has signed and 
communicated acceptance of the offer (s 369(2)).
This will often occur where a counter-offer is made by the seller 
and it addresses the problem under the previous rules whereby 
common law contract rules of formation were abrogated by the 
Act.32
Section 365 has been repealed. This provision changed  
common law contract by declaring the point of being bound 
occurred when the buyer or buyer’s agent received the warning 
statement and the contract in a way prescribed by the section. 
This change restores common law rules of bindingness based 
on communication of acceptance of an offer.
While the buyer may still terminate for failure to give a warning  
statement (s 370), the termination must happen within 90 days 
of receipt of a copy of the contract (s 370(4)). Providing a 
time limitation renders this protection more in line with the 
provisions in the RSLA.
Similarly, the RSLA permits the tenant to rescind their otherwise 
binding contract (lease) within six months of commencement of the 
lease, and to recover damages, if the landlord fails to disclose in terms 
30 PAMDA, s 365 — repealed by Property Agents and Motor Dealers and 
Other Legislation Amendment Act 2010 (Qld).
31 Explanatory Memorandum, Property Agents and Motor Dealers and Other 
Legislation Amendment Bill 2010, 2.
32 See, eg, Kate Galloway, ‘Legislating Conscience into Contract: How the 
Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 Affects our Understanding 
of Contract Law in Queensland Residential Land Sales’ (December 
2007–January 2008) 21 Commercial Law Quarterly 3.
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of the Act.33 The RSLA also requires the tenant to provide a legal and 
fi nancial advice certifi cate.34 While failure to comply will not challenge 
the inviolability of the bargain in terms of the Act, it may constitute a 
‘retail tenancy dispute’,35 wherein the parties may seek an order for the 
certifi cate to be furnished.
The implication in these provisions is that without warnings, disclosures 
and third party advice, the buyer (of residential land) and tenant (of a 
retail shop) are exposed to seller/landlord unconscionability that may 
provide grounds for ending the bargain. Presumably, in light of the 
explanatory memoranda, the assumption is that the statutory intervention 
will imbue the regulated transactions with conscience (thus removing 
this as a cause of action before the courts or tribunals involved). 
In the case of the RSLA, which includes unconscionability as a basis of 
dispute before the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal,36 the 
mechanisms of disclosure and advice presumably provide the evidence 
of equitable information exchange. This potentially resolves allegations 
of unconscionability before they escalate to dispute.
Either way, in ensuring a standard of conscience through the prescribed 
contracting process, any power imbalance between the contracting 
parties is presumably corrected and the bargain is thus supported. The 
latest proposed amendments to PAMDA seem to recognise, however, 
that power has shifted too far — resulting in ‘technical breaches’ and an 
‘uncertain marketplace’.37 This highlights that in both Acts, and in spite 
of proposed PAMDA amendments, the assumption of sites of power is 
somewhat problematic.
B  Situating the Imbalance
The locus of the Acts’ provisions in previously unregulated (or only 
generally regulated) and open real property markets, makes what the 
author considers to be fairly bold assumptions of the power relations 
between the parties. The Acts focus on empowerment of all buyers and 
tenants, at the expense of all sellers and landlords. In these markets, 
there is a blend of the personal (purchase of a home, or a lease of 
premises for a family-run business) with the commercial (investment 
33 RSLA, s 22.
34 RSLA, s 22D.
35 RSLA, s 22E.
36 RSLA, ss 46B, 63, 97; and defi nition of ‘retail tenancy dispute’.
37 Explanatory Memorandum, Property Agents and Motor Dealers and Other 
Acts Amendment Bill 2010, 2.
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property or retail leasing involving sophisticated business people). The 
state of market fl uctuation in each case will often determine the power 
dynamic between the parties. 
In the context of these regulated real property markets, previously 
within the purview of common law contract, the means of protection of 
a contracting party represents a shift. Previously, the law could protect 
a contracting party through statutory terms (such as misrepresentation, 
or false and misleading conduct38) or through (common law) equitable 
principles such as unconscionability, which examine the power dynamics 
in the individual case. In the case of the Acts, even considering the latest 
proposed PAMDA amendments, the inviolability of the conveyancing 
or leasing contract itself is put in question ostensibly to pre-empt the 
possibility of unconscionable conduct.
III  UNCONSCIONABILITY: FROM EQUITY TO STATUTE
Early cases on unconscionability focus on the nascent nature of contract 
law of the time. The affl uent classes were those engaged in transactions 
that came before the courts, and real property and expectant interests 
were the focus. These cases formed the underlying principle that 
‘there is always fraud presumed or inferred from the circumstances or 
conditions of the parties contracting where there is weakness on one 
side and advantage taken of that weakness’.39  
The leading modern Australian case on unconscionability, Commercial 
Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio,40 illustrates that justice and equity 
apparently continue to underscore the courts’ application of the law 
of contract, albeit in a different context to that of Earl of Aylesford v 
Morris.41 Amadio confi rms that the courts continue to apply the rules 
of classical contract theory to establish formation of a contract, then 
examine whether conscience is a vitiating factor, according to equitable 
doctrine.
But, as Professor Finn has pointed out,42 conscience is not anchored 
within doctrine alone and has developed into a principle underpinning 
equity generally. Anthony Duggan identifi es that 
38 See, eg, Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 52; soon to be replaced by ACL2, 
s 151.
39 Earl of Aylesford v Morris [1871] A 67.
40 (1983) 151 CLR 447.
41 [1871] A 67.
42 Paul Finn, ‘Commerce, the Common Law and Morality’ (1989) 17 
Melbourne University Law Review 87.
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[p]erhaps the most enduring characteristic of the High Court’s 
approach over the years to private law adjudication has been its 
commitment to equity and the equitable notion of conscience 
(‘unconscionability’) as a basis for reforming the law and 
changing entitlements.43
Law reform and changing entitlements based on conscience have not 
been the sole preserve of the courts of equity. The principle of conscience 
has moved beyond its roots. The emergence of notions of good faith in 
statute and case law,44 for example, confi rm that ‘commitment to equity 
and equitable notions of conscience’ is infl uencing the development of 
contract law outside its traditional sphere. 
This suggests that parliaments and the courts are increasingly sensitive 
to the possibilities of harsh outcomes arising from strict application of 
the laissez-faire contract rules. Their approach, however, has broadened 
from its foundation in the equitable doctrine. This is borne out by 
the rationale behind the enactment of the provisions under review in 
this paper, but it remains unclear whether Parliament’s approach will 
achieve the protections sought.
A  The Meaning of ‘Unconscionability’
Traditionally, in terms of the doctrine of unconscionability,45 
‘unconscionability’ was a term of art which implied an immorality in 
the transaction.46 It related to a power imbalance,47 where the powerful 
party knew of a special disadvantage and took advantage of the weaker 
party regardless.
Amadio was the watershed case in Australia providing the defi nitive 
modern application of the principle. The case discussed the doctrine and 
the circumstances of its application suffi ciently to lay the foundation 
for certainty in this area of the law. Rather than provide a checklist 
of circumstances of disadvantage, the court saw unconscionability as 
43 A J Duggan, ‘The Profi ts of Conscience: Commercial Equity in the High 
Court of Australia’ (2003) 24 Australian Business Review 30, [5].
44 See, eg, Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works 
(1992) 26 NSWLR 234; Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices 
Australia (1997) 146 ALR 1; Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 51AC(4)(k).
45 Given voice in cases such as Earl of Aylesford v Morris [1871] A 67.
46 See, eg, Brenda Marshall, ‘Liability for Unconscionable and Misleading 
Conduct in Commercial Dealings: Balancing Commercial Morality and 
Individual Responsibility’ (1995) 7 Bond Law Review 42.
47 Paul Finn, ‘Unconscionable Conduct’ (1994) 8 Journal of Contract Law 
37, 47.
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an ‘underlying general principle, which may be invoked whenever one 
party by reason of some condition of circumstance is placed at a special 
disadvantage vis-à-vis another, and unfair or unconscientious advantage 
is then taken of the opportunity thereby created’. It was not enough for 
there to be simply a difference in the bargaining power of the parties — 
the ‘special’ disadvantage must be in the order of a 
disabling condition or circumstance … which seriously affects 
the ability of the innocent party to make a judgment as to his own 
best interests, when the other party knows or ought to know of 
the existence of that condition or circumstance and of its effect 
on the innocent party.48
More recent Australian authorities provide a clear guide to the application 
of rules of unconscionability. In Louth v Diprose,49 the appellant 
induced the respondent to give her money to purchase a house on the 
threat of self-harm. Brennan J discussed the elements of the dishonest 
conduct which smacked of fraud: a relationship placing the donor at a 
special disadvantage; the donee’s unconscientious exploitation of the 
disadvantage; and the consequent overbearing of the will of the donor, 
who is unable to make a worthwhile judgement in his best interests. The 
respondent was in a position of emotional dependence on the appellant: 
she was in a position to infl uence his actions and decisions, resulting 
in the improvident transaction. In this case, the appellant was found to 
have deliberately used the infatuation and her own deceit to procure 
a benefi t — this tipped the scales in favour of applying equity, which 
would not merely relieve the plaintiff of the consequences of their own 
foolishness.
Since Amadio and Louth v Diprose, the application of ‘unconscionability’ 
has broadened somewhat. Dal Pont, for example, argues that Bridgewater 
v Leahy50 rather than focussing on parties’ conduct, focuses on the 
quality of the outcome of the transaction.51  
In Bridgwater v Leahy, an elderly man made an inter vivos transfer of 
family farming property to his nephew, who had worked the land with 
his uncle for many years. The uncle, before his death, made it clear to 
his solicitor why he was making the transfer on its favourable terms 
48 Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447, 462.
49 (1992) 175 CLR 621.
50 (1998) 158 ALR 66.
51 G Dal Pont, ‘The Varying Shades of “Unconscionable” Conduct — Same 
Term, Different Meaning’ (2000) 19 Australian Business Review 135, 146.
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— the nephew had ‘stuck with him through thick and thin’,52 and he 
wanted to see the family farming business carry on under competent 
stewardship. There was no suggestion of the uncle’s not being capable 
of making a decision such as this, or that the transaction did not refl ect 
his wishes. However, the majority decision points out that it was the 
mere fact of the nephew’s having the benefi t of this transaction that 
imputed unconscionability. As Dal Pont points out, this differs from 
establishing conduct by the nephew that was unconscionable. It was 
more the unfairness of the outcome of the transaction from which 
unconscionability was implied.53
On this view, ‘unconscionability’ takes a broader meaning: it appears 
to be restricted no longer in its application to the equitable doctrine 
of unconscionable conduct in the Amadio mould. The broader use has 
perhaps been assisted by the 1992 and 1998 amendments to the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth).54 While s 51AA brings commercial dealings 
within the unwritten law of unconscionable conduct, s 51AC provides 
an expanded concept of unconscionability, ‘with additional criteria 
for judicial reference’.55 Bridgewater v Leahy56, however, applies the 
concept even more broadly again than these provisions warrant — the 
judgement is not expressed in terms of the ‘criteria for judicial reference’ 
cited, for example, in s 51AC.
Further evidence for the potential of the broadening of unconscionability 
is provided within arguments in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v 
Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd 57 which sought to use ‘unconscionability’ 
as a bar to the appellant using a fi lm which had been taken while 
trespassing. In contrast to the traditional use of unconscionability, the 
‘transaction’ involved in Lenah was not a contract. This renders the 
attempted use of the principle of unconscionability as a novel one and 
well outside the scope of an Amadio application. The Commonwealth, 
intervening, argued that: 
in determining whether the use of the information would 
be unconscionable, the court should take account of all the 
52 Bridgewater v Leahy (1998) 194 CLR 457, 489.
53 Dal Pont, above n 51, 145–6.
54 See below; soon to become ss 21, 22 under ACL2.
55 Liam Brown, ‘The Impact of Section 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth) on Commercial Certainty’ [2004] Melbourne University Law 
Review 20.
56 (1998) 194 CLR 457.
57 (2001) 208 CLR 199.
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circumstances of the case, including the competing public 
interests in preserving the rule of law, protecting private property 
and in otherwise protecting the relevant information and the 
public interest in freedom of speech.58 
Nowhere in this submission is there mention of Amadio-style special 
disadvantage — and nor could there be, in terms of the nature of the 
procurement of the information outside contractual relations. The 
submissions sought to use the concept of ‘unconscionability’ in a much 
broader sense than that traditionally used.  
Ultimately these submissions were rejected. Gleeson CJ observed:
No doubt it is correct to say that, if equity will intervene to 
restrain publication of the fi lm by the appellant, the ultimate 
ground will be that, in all the circumstances, it would be 
unconscionable of the appellant to publish. But that leaves the 
question of the principles according to which equity will reach 
that conclusion.59
This was supported by Gummow and Hayne JJ, who said that ‘the 
notion of unconscionable behaviour does not operate wholly at large as 
Lenah would appear to have it.’60 Though unconscionability was tested 
in a broader application in this case, the court rejected it as a primary 
source of rights in favour of its place merely as an element required for 
the application of the rules of equity.
This case illustrates how the concept of unconscionability (rather than 
the doctrine) could be expanded from its Amadio sense as an exception 
to contract focussing on the parties’ conduct, to a broader duty of 
fairness and an assessment of the fairness of outcome of a bargain or 
fairness in dealings more generally: an obligation which could underpin 
more discrete areas of law from contract to tort, to newer concepts such 
as privacy also argued in Lenah Game Meats.
It is this type of broad obligation not just to behave in a conscientious 
manner, but to achieve a fair outcome in dealings, which forms the 
context of conscience relevant to the Acts.
B  Conscience in the Acts 
The primary locus for the concept of conscience in the PAMDA provisions 
lies in the second reading debates. The Act represented a bid to ‘rid 
58 Ibid 199, 211.
59 Ibid 199, 227.
60 Ibid 199, 245.
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the Queensland real property industry’ of ‘crooks’.61 In amendments 
debated in 2001, the Parliament sought to proscribe ‘unconscionable 
practices’ of marketeers.62 While the Act itself fails to refer to conscience 
or unconscionable conduct, the genesis of the consumer protection 
provisions is clear:63 an explicit reference to behaviour, but not within 
the original Amadio-type framework.
On this reading, the consumer protection mechanisms in the PAMDA 
can be understood in terms of conscience. The warning statement 
coupled with the cooling-off period, together provide a means by which 
to ensure procedural fairness and fairness of outcome. In alerting the 
buyer to the implications of the contract and the ability to withdraw 
with only nominal penalty, the warning statement allows the buyer 
breathing space before taking full contractual responsibility. 
The warning statement allows also for information exchange through 
alerting the buyer to the importance of legal advice and valuation 
advice before becoming bound by the contract. This refl ects a focus 
on transactional fairness — that the terms of the contract, including the 
price of the bargain, are fair to the buyer.
The fact that the contract can be terminated by the buyer in the absence 
of compliance with the warning statement provisions, challenges the 
inviolability of the bargain. This consumer protection mechanism 
reinforces that if conscience is not evidenced through process (and 
therefore the possibility of transactional fairness also), the bargain is 
not worthy of protection at law.
In contrast to the lack of express unconscionability provisions in the 
PAMDA, the RSLA expressly proscribes unconscionable conduct by 
both the landlord and the tenant.64 In determining whether there has 
been unconscionable conduct under s 46B, the QCAT may have regard 
to a range of issues that refl ect those in s 51AC of the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth) and also the unfair contracts provisions in the ACL1.65 
The unconscionability provisions therefore mirror other protective 
61 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 13 September 2001, 2703 (Hon M 
Rose, Minister for Tourism and Racing, and Minister for Fair Trading).
62 Explanatory Memorandum, Property Agents and Motor Dealers Amendment 
Bill 2001 (Qld), 1.
63 See Galloway, ‘Legislating Conscience into Contract’ above n 32.
64 RSLA, s 46A.
65 For example, the relative strength of parties’ bargaining position, undue 
infl uence, lease conditions that are not reasonably necessary.
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devices66 — however, they are explicitly provided for in the RSLA to 
bring them within the jurisdiction of the QCAT.67 This arm of the Act’s 
methodology creates a cost-effective system for dispute resolution as 
an alternative to the courts — another consumer protection feature of 
the Act.
While the RSLA may overtly appeal to conscience via sections 46A 
and 46B, conscience arguably also implicitly draws together all 
its regulatory measures. Like the PAMDA, the Act stands up for the 
ostensibly weaker party though not to the extent that they suffer from 
a ‘special disadvantage’. Larger retail spaces and leases by a public 
corporation or its subsidiary are excluded from the Act,68 and tenants 
of fi ve or more retail shops are not bound by s 22D (legal and fi nancial 
advice certifi cates). This supports the idea that tenants likely to be at 
a bargaining or information disadvantage are the target of the Act’s 
protection — tenants of smaller retail spaces and tenants who have 
fewer than fi ve retail shops.69  
Again, as with the PAMDA warning statement, through the RSLA 
disclosure provisions, the conduct of each party is intended to occur 
on a ‘level playing fi eld’ of information so that the extent of disclosure 
or its purpose is no longer an issue of conscience. Lack of information 
is often a means by which a stronger party may take advantage of the 
weaker and Parliament seeks to negate that possibility. 
As well as disclosure, enforced help for the tenant (via legal and fi nancial 
advice) is designed to minimise procedural unfairness in the Amadio 
mould. In common law cases arguing unconscionability, evidence of 
fi nancial and legal advice and assistance before entering the contract 
would be signifi cant in showing that an imbalance had been addressed.70
66 See, eg, Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld), ACL.
67 ‘While the Commonwealth provisions may be accessed by the retail 
industry in Queensland, seeking redress via the Federal Court is less 
accessible in terms of time and cost when compared with the Retail Shop 
Lease Tribunal processes’, Explanatory Memorandum, Retail Shop Leases 
Amendment Bill 2000 (Qld), 13. The Retail Shop Lease Tribunal function 
is now carried out by the QCAT.
68 Section 5.
69 Explanatory Memorandum, Retail Shop Leases Amendment Bill 2000 
(Qld), 7.
70 See, eg, Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447, 
477, where the Amadios ‘lacked assistance and advice where assistance 
and advice were plainly necessary if there were to be any reasonable degree 
of equality between themselves and the bank’.
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In addition to procedural fairness, the requirement of external advice 
could be seen as moving towards achieving transactional fairness. 
Presumably a tenant with fi nancial advice will not proceed with a 
transaction which represents a signifi cant loss. Transactional fairness 
is achieved also through the minimum lease standards prescribed in the 
Act71 and impliedly through the unconscionability provisions, which 
can consider the terms on which the tenant could get an alternative 
lease.
If it is unconscionable for the landlord to fail to disclose aspects of a deal, 
in requiring disclosure, Parliament is effectively legislating conscience 
into the process of contracting for retail shop leases in Queensland. 
This approach to conscience is supported through the device of 
listing relevant factors for considering unconscionability, including 
transactional issues.72 The implication is that conduct resulting in a gain 
or loss to a party outside what the market would ordinarily bear, may 
fall foul of good conscience in terms of the Act.73 In addition the factors 
include procedural issues such as unfair tactics, consistency of conduct 
and good faith.74 
The RSLA overtly seeks to regulate unconscionable conduct in the 
context of retail shop leases by adopting the traditional (Trade Practices 
Act) framework of identifying unconscionable conduct with reference 
to a ‘checklist’.75 However, both the RSLA and the PAMDA take this 
traditional framework further by requiring all those entering into the 
designated class of contract to produce evidence of a level playing 
fi eld at the outset of their relationship — even where this evidence 
may not be used explicitly for the purpose of addressing the issue of 
unconscionability. 
If it can be argued that the Acts, in attempting to introduce conscience 
into the regulated contracts, operate differently from the more traditional 
doctrine of unconscionability (and its statutory counterparts), then 
how can we conceptualise the role of conscience in these species of 
contract?
71 RSLA, Part 6.
72 RSLA, s 46A.
73 RSLA, s 46B(1)(b), (e).
74 RSLA, s 46B(1)(d), (f), (k).
75 See RSLA, s 46B.
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IV  LEGISLATED CONSCIENCE — EXCEPTION OR STANDARD?
While consumer protection is given voice through legislation such as 
Trade Practices Act and RSLA that specifi cally introduce conscience into 
contracts within a commercial context, they apply a framework similar 
to that of the common law: ascertaining the existence of a contract 
based on traditional contract law, then identifying whether the relevant 
vitiating factors apply. That is to say, equitable doctrine or its statutory 
equivalent — through vitiating factors such as unconscionability — 
operates in tandem with the classical contract framework, but outside 
it. 
There is, however, a theoretical basis on which conscience could 
be seen to form an integral part of the classical contract framework 
rather than an exception. On this basis, conscience can be understood 
as supporting the liberal notion of freedom of contract by setting the 
standard for mutuality of the parties — truly ensuring a free bargain. 
Additionally, freedom according to this standard of conscience may 
see mutuality refl ected in ‘just price’ or fair terms, and ultimately 
through attention to the formation process and information equality 
(ie, substantive transactional conscionability), it may embody true 
individual autonomy. This type of framework distinguishes equitable 
Amadio unconscionability and its legislative counterparts as an 
exception, focussing only on conduct.
To the extent that these consumer protection mechanisms interfere with 
the application of general principles of common law (classical) contract, 
it could be argued that the Acts separate these species of transaction 
from general (classical) contract law and place them as an exception 
to general rules — just as unconscionability itself can be regarded as 
an exception to the norms of contract.76 However, the underpinning 
principle of conscience in the Acts may also provide a means by which 
these mechanisms can be seen to embody classical contract norms 
of mutuality — it may offer a mediating concept between consumer 
protection and free market contract. This part of the paper canvasses 
these arguments and assesses whether the statutory provisions can 
be seen, through this mediating factor of conscience, to reinforce 
fundamental aspects of the market, or whether they simply make these 
types of contract an exception to classical contract law.
76 See Gilmore, above n 2.
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A  Conscience as the Standard of Mutuality
As observed, one of the challenges in applying conscience within the 
framework of classical contract law is the potential to alter the accepted 
wisdom of libertarian principles of freedom of contract and personal 
autonomy of contracting parties. In doing so, it might be argued that the 
mechanisms of classical contract law are so altered that they cease to 
operate altogether and the arrangement falls outside contract law.
Bigwood provides a framework to draw these ideas together. He has 
observed the historical importance of freedom of contract tempered by 
the application of justice and equity.77 His idea of ‘conscience’ is one 
rooted in equity, which forms the standard for a consensus-building 
relationship. In this way equity provides a theoretical foundation for 
mutuality. Its purpose is not to disturb the allocation of tolerable risks, 
but rather to justify legitimate intrusions into freedom of contract 
(presumably via equitable notions of conscience) as institutional 
responses to imperfections which exist in markets.78  
In support (albeit in the US context), DiMatteo79 argues that ‘a new 
paradigmatic principle — unconscionability — has emerged. This 
principle explains and justifi es the limits that should be placed upon 
the bargain principle on the basis of the quality of a bargain’ (emphasis 
added) — without conscience, there is no freedom of contract. This 
conceptual framework differs from that which might excise from 
contract law any subject matter regulated externally.80 It would retain 
regulated contracts (such as consumer contracts) by accepting limitation 
on freedoms otherwise presumed in contract law.81 Likewise, Atiyah 
argues that contract can accommodate these limits on freedoms, as 
without conscience there would be no free agreement (ie, one without 
pressure). 82 
These broad standards of conscience form the background to the overall 
77 Bigwood, above n 5, [7].
78 Ibid [23].
79 Larry DiMatteo ‘Equity’s Modifi cation of Contract: An Analysis of the 
Twentieth Century’s Equitable Reformation of Contract Law’ (1999) 33 
New England Law Review 265, 293.
80 See, eg, P S Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979), 405, 
quoting Friedman L, Contract Law in America, 20.
81 See, eg, Galloway, ‘Statutory Modifi cation’, above n 1.
82 See Atiyah’s market model in Atiyah, above n 80.
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consumer protection methodology adopted by both statutes,83 although 
neither unconscionability nor unfairness is explicitly mentioned in 
PAMDA itself. The assumption is that the Acts’ consumer protection 
measures support the operation of the free market, and free market 
contract. The question remains, however, of the extent to which 
conscience provides a useful mediating concept between consumer 
protection and contract.
Unconscionability in PAMDA is not defi ned, thus compromising its 
consumer protection effectiveness. DiMatteo argues that this will impair 
the parties’ understanding of the purpose of the disclosure or warning 
provisions.84 If it were explicit that the formalities were to pre-empt a 
defi ned proscribed conduct, application of the Act would be seen by the 
consumer as relevant, thus enhancing its desired effect. Failure to make 
this explicit reduces the consumer protection effect.
Griggs too, argues in favour of conceptual clarity.85 While the strong 
language employed in the Parliament upon the introduction of PAMDA, 
and government support for ongoing consumer protection provisions86 
suggest an underlying rationale of conscience in all aspects of the Act, 
there is no apparent standard of conscience in the Act itself.  
On the other hand, s 46A RSLA explicitly proscribes unconscionability 
for both landlord and tenant. While s 46B contains matters which may 
be taken into consideration in determining unconscionable conduct, it is 
left unsaid in the statute that unconscionability is relevant to the scheme 
of disclosure and provisions for lawful early termination of the lease. It 
could be said that attempts to alter unconscionable behaviour through 
a specifi c scheme of disclosure fail to satisfy DiMatteo’s and Griggs’ 
requirement of transparency, but the context of the Act as a whole supports 
a standard of conscience in retail shop lease dealings. Conscience in 
this sense does not mediate between contract and consumer protection, 
however, as the unconscionability provisions operate parallel to the 
equitable doctrine of unconscionability — whereby a contract is tested 
83 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 13 September 2001, 2670–709 
(various speakers); Explanatory Memorandum, Property Agents and Motor 
Dealers Amendment Bill 2001 (Qld), 1, 2.
84 DiMatteo, above n 79, 294.
85 Lynden Griggs, ‘The Interrelationship of Consumer Values and Institutions 
to the Vendor’s Duty of Disclosure’ (2005) 11 Australian Property Law 
Journal 19, [16].
86 See Explanatory Memorandum, Property Agents and Motor Dealers and 
Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2010 (Qld).
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after the fact — rather than embodying a new standard by which to 
measure mutuality from the outset of the transaction.
While the measures taken in each Act are impliedly based on conscience, 
it is the lack of explicit defi nition of conscience that results in only 
limited support for a reframed standard of mutuality which would fi t 
within common law contract principles. This undermines the potential 
of such provisions to provide effective consumer protection within the 
free market context.87
B  Conscience as a Marker of Capacity
Related to mutuality in contract is the issue of capacity of the contracting 
parties. Waddams identifi es that in applying the standard of conscience 
to determine mutuality, those the standard seeks to protect are deprived 
of the power of contractual capacity.88 Additionally, the benefi t of such 
a law increases with the wealth of the weaker party, evidencing an 
alteration in the risk (and therefore benefi t) of the transaction. This may 
change the conceptualisation of the nature of the market and of the basis 
of freedom of contractual dealings.
If, however, adjusting the market can be read as consistent with the 
classical theory,89 the unconscionability of equity need not operate 
externally to the law of contract. It could instead form part of the 
contractual framework. On this approach, removal of contractual 
capacity as described by Waddams90 may fall within Bigwood and 
DiMatteo’s91 ‘acceptable’ limits to absolute freedom. Unconscionability 
as a standard of contract law itself would be justifi able where freedom 
would otherwise no longer exist and a ‘market model’ of contract is 
undermined.92  
The uniform application of each Act to all tenants/buyers as the weaker 
party defi nes them as having only restricted capacity to contract — 
capacity which requires support in the form of disclosure/warning 
statements and a cooling-off period. Whether this truly empowers this 
87 See also Griggs, above n 85; Galloway, ‘Legislating Conscience into 
Contract’, above n 32.
88 S M Waddams, ‘Unconscionable Contracts: Competing Perspectives’ 
(1999) Saskatchewan Law Review 1, [15].
89 See Atiyah, above n 80.
90 See Waddams, above n 88.
91 Bigwood, above n 5; DiMatteo, above n 79.
92 See Atiyah, above n 80.
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class,93 or truly prevents (equitable) unconscionable conduct, is open 
to question. Certainly these parties have a unilateral right to end the 
contract where the paperwork is not in order, and in the case of PAMDA, 
within the cooling-off period.  
Waddams would prefer legislative intervention to the application of the 
doctrine of unconscionability, which he argues operates on an individual 
basis and is therefore not an appropriate way to assist a class of persons.94 
The legislation does address this critique of unconscionability to the 
extent that Parliament takes responsibility for assisting a class — but 
for all the prescription concerning the content of warning and disclosure 
statements,95 Parliament has failed to inform buyers and tenants the 
express conduct to be averted.  
Hugh Collins takes Waddams’ point further, identifying that the general 
criticism of such regulation as that it ‘invariably harms those groups it 
is designed to protect’ through a backfi ring of the market.96 His view 
though is that ‘a hybrid reasoning based on open-textured rules [such 
as unconscionability] still provides a superior regulatory strategy to 
formalism and the rigid rule of enforcement’.97 PAMDA fails to represent 
such a hybrid reasoning, relying as it does on rigid enforcement through 
the blunt instrument of warning statements, against a pre-identifi ed party 
(though softened somewhat by the proposed amendments). The RSLA 
unconscionability provisions might represent this hybrid approach, but 
the disclosure/advice statements do not. 
Specifi cally though, it is worth exploring how the Acts, through a 
philosophy of conscience, can be seen to challenge the capacity of the 
parties to these transactions.
First, Hansard makes it clear that Parliament identifi ed purchasers as 
those who ‘require’ protection under PAMDA.98 Accordingly, a seller 
stands to lose a sale where their agent has failed to complete paperwork 
properly, even where the seller has derived no improper gain in terms 
of the doctrine or the principle of unconscionability. An otherwise fair 
93 See, eg, Galloway, ‘Statutory Modifi cation’, above n 1.
94 Waddams, above n 88, [15].
95 PAMDA, s 386; Retail Shop Leases Regulation 2006 (Qld), Part 2.
96 Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford University Press, 1999), 
274.
97 Ibid.
98 See, eg, Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 7 September 2000, 3103 
(Hon JC Spence, Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Policy 
and Minister for Women’s Policy and Minister for Fair Trading).
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retail shop landlord may likewise be left to the mercy of a tenant under 
RSLA. 
It is recognised that many more retail shop leases than residential land 
sales will involve parties of uniformly disparate bargaining power. It 
is only a comparatively small proportion of residential land contracts99 
where a marketeer (ostensibly the target of the legislation) is likely 
to be the seller, and where others stand to earn commissions at the 
expense of the buyer. On the other hand, Queensland shopping centres 
were estimated to represent $9.6 billion of capital in 2001, and 53 per 
cent of all retail sales.100 The ‘majority’ of this capital investment was 
contributed to or owned by superannuation funds and listed property 
trusts101 — with ample fi nance and market power. Fifty-seven per cent 
of specialty shops were owned by independent traders or small business 
franchises.102 Where the RSLA causes a redistribution of wealth from 
a corporate landlord to a consumer tenant, it can be argued that the 
consumer protection mechanism achieves its goal — but only where 
addressing a landlord’s unconscionability. It is not so clear whether 
giving a retail tenant indiscriminate power to defer or delay negotiations 
or entry into a lease improves the capacity of the parties according to a 
standard of conscience. Either way, the indiscriminate presumption of 
disempowerment of a tenant fails to recognise the variation in relative 
power in the retail shop lease market, thus debasing the capacity that 
the tenant may have according to market forces.
The issue of power differentials in the application of principles of 
conscience affects the parties’ capacity to contract under the Acts in a 
further way. Landlords and sellers who are in fact the weaker party are 
denied full contractual capacity under the Acts where they prevent a 
bilateral right to enforce. The right to terminate during the cooling-off 
period, or for non-compliance with a warning or disclosure statement 
may intervene in a contract, which under the general law would 
have been valid and upheld even upon application of the doctrine of 
99 Nationally, there were 49,406 fi nanced existing dwellings in April 2005, 
but only 2,167 fi nanced new dwellings in the same month — Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, ‘5609.0 Housing Finance, Australia’ (April 2005). This 
highlights the difference between the market in existing houses (less likely 
to be marketed by marketeers) and new ones (which are more likely).
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unconscionability. Parliament has determined that the defi ned parties 
and therefore society should benefi t, but has failed to articulate the 
extent to which individuals or other classes do not. These others are 
denied consensus or full capacity to contract, and by virtue of this the 
mutual nature of contract is diminished in spite of the arguments in 
favour of conscience as the standard for mutuality.
C  Transactional Conscience
The discussion so far suggests that setting a standard of mutuality is one 
conceptualisation of conscience as part of the framework of contract 
which does not necessarily support classical notions of freedom of 
contract and the parties’ capacity. An alternative conceptualisation is 
derived from the mediæval notion of a just price, where a bargain would 
be fairly carried out without loss or gain to either side, and where justice 
was more important than freedom of choice.103  
Waddams’ distinction between unconscionable conduct and unconscio-
nable transactions (as in Earl of Aylesford v Morris)104 illustrates the 
difference between the process and the outcome — where just price 
is refl ected in the outcome. DiMatteo also looks at the evolution of 
equitable principles from the theory of just price. Within classical con-
tract law, the development of the doctrine of consideration formed an 
alternative to an examination of the terms of a transaction: it was a 
formality to satisfy the notion of fairness of exchange. The doctrine 
of unconscionability and equitable estoppel both provided an excuse 
to examine the fairness of a contract (transactional unconscionability) 
outside the doctrine of consideration. On this view, the concept of just 
price continues to underpin contract law (in its broader sense).
As an alternative, but still grounded in just price, statutory forms provide 
a systematic method of preventing substantive unconscionability: but 
again, provided unconscionability or unfairness is adequately defi ned.105 
To justify intervention within an otherwise assumed free market, the 
adjustment process must be made according to transparent principles. 
There is more likely to be a successful intervention where market 
participants are aware of the nature of the unfairness to be sanctioned. 
While the Acts may fail to provide a clear standard of conscionable 
103 See, eg, Atiyah, above n 80, 61–2.
104 Waddams, above n 88, [3].
105 DiMatteo, above n 79 294.
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behaviour by which parties’ transactions can be measured, they do 
appear to refl ect the thinking of a just price through the RSLA fi nancial 
advice certifi cate and the PAMDA warning statement. In each case the 
tenant/buyer is required or encouraged to draw on third party expertise 
as to fair market price, rather than be part of the market themselves in 
determining what they are prepared to pay.
The measures fall short of meeting standards suggested by DiMatteo’s 
transparency and Griggs’ articulated values. On Waddams’ argument, 
they may do no more than simply reallocate risks.106 These critiques 
rest on the failure of each set of provisions to defi ne the unfairness or 
unconscionability to be averted. 
While the mechanisms in the Acts may not provide a comprehensive 
solution to questions of conscience in the contracts they regulate, 
they arguably do afford an example of the application of principles 
of conscience into contract by attempting to focus parties’ attention 
on adequacy of price and terms. The question remains, however, 
whether the measures in these Acts can be conceptualised as part of the 
common law contract methodology through the more traditional idea of 
protecting freedom of parties to contract, but by applying a standard of 
conscience. This is because of the application of the measures to only 
one of the parties to the transaction, rather than a genuine attempt at 
determining mutuality.
D  Procedural Conscience
In addition to the impact on the parties’ transactional conscience 
and capacity already discussed, procedural conscience, the nature of 
conscience, and contract law itself is subverted by the provisions in the 
Acts. 
The fi rst issue in procedural fairness is the provision of disclosure/
warning material to create a ‘level playing fi eld’. Both Acts take this 
approach, though the RSLA is a more refi ned approach, requiring 
the landlord to take responsibility for providing the tenant with 
information. It is clear, however, regardless of the lack of defi nition of 
unconscionability in either Act, that the Acts share a goal of achieving 
conscience in a procedural sense.
While a scheme to protect a class of consumer is most appropriately 
implemented by Parliament,107 Parliament through these Acts 
106 Waddams, above n 88, [3].
107 Waddams, above n 88, [3].
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denies individuals the application of the rules of conscience to their 
circumstances. The benefi ts of this approach are therefore largely lost. 
In addition to the uniform presumption of parties’ disempowerment, 
the Acts108 remove discretion to identify the traditional elements of 
common law unconscionability which look to procedural fairness: 
conduct that is unconscionable, that there is a special disadvantage, that 
the disadvantage was exploited, and that it would be unconscionable to 
procure a benefi t from the transaction. 109 
V  CONCLUSION
It can be seen that while conscience may be the principle underlying 
these Acts, its expression is denied in any recognisable sense. 
This in itself alters the traditional understanding of ‘conscience’ or 
‘unconscionability’, which further muddies the understanding of 
what the Acts are trying to achieve. It is likely that the goal of the 
legislation extends beyond traditional unconscionability, and certainly 
beyond procedural unconscionability. However, replacing this explicit 
assessment of a party’s individual circumstances with regulated 
procedural fairness in contract formation, denies a mechanism to 
address genuine unfair dealing and waters down the effectiveness of 
the Acts — although leaving consumers with recourse under other 
consumer protection measures whether common law or statute.110
The most subtle of the impacts of the uniform approach to conscience is 
the subversion of the contract process itself. Those to be protected under 
the legislation only fall into their class by virtue of their (common law) 
legal relationship with the other party. At common law, a contract will 
exist before arguments of unconscionability arise to limit its validity. The 
parties’ relationship will be relevant fi rst because they have a contract. 
Having been established via their contract, their relationship is relevant 
subsequently in relation to bargaining power and other duties and 
obligations. For the purpose of the Acts, however, a bargain is liable to 
termination unless the statutory formalities are fi rst adhered to, rendering 
the bargaining process secondary to the statutory requirements.  
While the infrastructure of common law contract is used to render the 
assistance deemed necessary by Parliament, ultimately the legislation 
potentially disallows application of the common law rules. This blurs the 
lines between the broad underlying statutory conceptions of conscience 
108 Outside the specifi c unconscionability provisions in the RSLA.
109 Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447.
110 Such as Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), and more specifi cally, the ACL1.
108 Kate Galloway
and the framework for dealing with that, and the common law contract 
framework, which is subject to the application of equity and the doctrine 
of unconscionability.
This paper set out to establish whether these provisions under review can 
be seen as shifting our conceptualisation of contract towards a reliance on 
a general standard of conscience within the framework of common law 
contract: conscience as a mediating factor between consumer protection 
and common law contract. One Act (RSLA) mentions unconscionability 
expressly, though not in terms of the adjustment of parties’ rights under 
contract, and the other (PAMDA) fails to mention conscience, though 
it is derived from a desire to achieve it. Each therefore fails to identify 
conscience as a standard by which to measure the appropriateness or 
validity of a regulated contract. However, each can be seen to represent 
an attempt to address transactional conscience through promoting a just 
price, and procedural conscience through information delivery. The 
price for that may be an abrogation of contractual capacity by those 
apparently disempowered, and a subversion of the application of the 
traditional conception of common law conscience, challenging how 
we see the nature of contract law within the contemporary regulatory 
environment. 
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